The Keres-Botvinnik Case: A Survey of the Evidence by Taylor Kingston Part II The case of Paul Keres and Mikhail Botvinnik is a chess equivalent of the John F. Kennedy assassination: an unsolved historical mystery full of dark implications, about which conflicting opinions and theories abound. Debate about the case has variously simmered or boiled for decades, and interest in it has recently increased. Two weeks ago, the first part of Taylor Kingston's intriguing article appeared at The Chess Cafe. (It may be found in The Chess Cafe Archives section). We are now pleased to present the second and final part... Botvinnik for the Defense Since Mikhail Botvinnik is, in a sense, the accused here, fairness requires that he be allowed to speak. Like Keres, he is dead, but his autobiography and certain interviews contain relevant statements. On the charge that he instigated Keres' arrest, Botvinnik told Valter Heuer in 1990: "I did not act against him, I never intrigued. To my mind this is below a chess player's dignity." He added that such rumors had been fueled some four years earlier by Karpov, in an interview by a Dr. Bernd Nielsen-Stokkeby. This German journalist researched Karpov's claims, and concluded "I consider Karpov's words a lie." Botvinnik did admit that he did nothing in particular to help Keres in 1944- 47, but as for seeking to hurt him, "I am above such nonsense." Certain episodes, as described in Botvinnik's autobiography "Achieving the Aim," are not consistent with conscious complicity on his part. His first game with Keres at Hague- Moscow 1948, in which Evans sees "fix" from move 21, lasted 58 moves. Botvinnik writes "The game adjourned with me a pawn up. I had to find a forced win ... but I cannot find it. I ask for help from Flohr. Salo does not let me down, and found such a 'quiet' move that it all became clear." (p. 114). This is the post-adjournment position Keres-Botvinnik, Hague-Moscow 1948, round 5 (See Diagram): White: Kh2,Qd1, Rb2, Bh3; pawns - a5, b6, c4, d3, e4, g3 Black: Kb8, Qf6, Rf7, Ng5; pawns - a7, b7, c5, d4, e5, g6, h5 The winning line was 41. ... h4! 42. Qg4 (42. gh4? Qf4+ 43. Kg2 Nf3!) hg3+ 43. Kxg3 Rf8! (Flohr's move) 44. bxa7+ Kxa7 45. a6 Nxh3 46. Qxh3 Qf4+! 47. Kg2 Qf1+ 48. Kh2 Rf2+ etc. That Botvinnik, a strong endgame player, needed help, seems totally at odds with the idea that both he and Keres knew the game was rigged. On Evans' claim that, ironically, Botvinnik threw his last Hague-Moscow game so that Keres could tie Reshevsky, we find: "There remained my final game with Keres ... I was thoroughly tired and [missed] a repetition of moves ... Some people concluded that I lost on purpose ... I confess that I have drawn by agreement ... but in my career I have never deliberately lost to anyone." (p. 121). Nor, in an earlier incident, would he accept a gift win. He recounts that before the last round of Moscow 1935, Soviet chess czar Krylenko proposed that Rabinovich purposely lose, to ensure Botvinnik 1st place. Botvinnik refused, saying "... then I will myself put a piece en prise and resign" (p. 43). This testimony is double-edged. It shows the Soviets already willing to rig important results, but Botvinnik feeling honor-bound to resist it. Two other incidents from "Aim" seem at odds with coercion theories. These describe the friendship that later grew between Keres and Botvinnik. On p. 166: "[In 1960] Keres had been a guest at my dacha. He saw how we struggled with the coal [and said] 'It's time to go over to automatic oil-fired heating ... You will have a quiet life and the results of your creative work will be better." Later Botvinnik describes Keres helping with analysis of a game in 1969: "Keres thought a little and said, 'Can't you play it like this?' We looked at each other and burst out laughing for a long time, ... so simple, unexpected and elegant was the decision Paul found." If Botvinnik had stolen Keres' lifelong dream, and Keres knew it, it would seem far more natural to nurse an unending hate- filled grudge, than to be such a man's house guest, to offer him friendly advice, and laugh with him like schoolboy chums. Perhaps Keres had the forgiving nature of a saint, or Botvinnik was a very artful liar, a disinformation artist on a par with Felix Derzhinsky or Josef Goebbels. One or the other seems required to sustain the coercion hypothesis, barring the idea that it was done without Botvinnik's knowledge or consent. Two things stand out in this. One, it is almost impossible to reconcile Evans' view of Hague-Moscow with Botvinnik's account. Evans is mistaken, or Botvinnik lied. Two, Botvinnik's public statements make the stakes for his posthumous reputation very high. For example in 1984 he said "[Keres] was psychologically unstable; when he had to win, he played weakly. Chess is a game for strong people with strong character." Botvinnik must be innocent of any complicity in any coercion on Keres, or these words stink of hypocrisy. Keres Coerced but Botvinnik Innocent? The Vukcevic Hypothesis Yet another scenario is offered by Milan Vukcevic, a Yugoslavian who emigrated to America in the mid-1960s, and who now lives in Cleveland, Ohio. Born in 1937, Vukcevic is a FIDE Master in OTB play and an International Grandmaster for Composition. I contacted him because of a letter, published by by Evans at "Chess Life," in which James Schroeder cited Vukcevic in support of his extreme views on the Keres case (though, oddly, Schroeder omitted any mention of Vukcevic in his "CHESS" article). Vukcevic discussed the Keres-Botvinnik case with me in a lengthy phone interview in late 1997. Vukcevic became acquainted with Keres in the 1950s (at a tournament in Hastings, England) and later with Botvinnik. In a nutshell, he believes Keres was coerced in 1948, but that Botvinnik had no part in it. He believes that Keres made inferior moves without Botvinnik's knowledge, and that possibly Botvinnik was fed advance information about Keres' planned opening repertoire from duplicitous seconds (a tactic Vukcevic says was once used against himself, in a Russian tournament, and which has been alleged in some recent world title matches). Of Vukcevic's hypothesis we can definitely say: (1) It is much narrower in scope than Schroeder's, directly contradicting him on Botvinnik's involvement, and offering him no support on allegations of post-1948 coercion. It is misleading of Schroeder to imply that he has Vukcevic's full support. (2) It partially contradicts Evans, as a Botvinnik free of complicity could not have purposely thrown his 5th game with Keres at Hague- Moscow. (3) It is the only scenario in which a coerced Keres and an innocent Botvinnik can coexist. Unfortunately, it is impossible to verify. Vukcevic's knowledge is not firsthand. Keres did not tell him anything related to Hague-Moscow while at Hastings. His opinion regarding coercion derives from a fellow Yugoslav, GM Petar Trifunovic, who died in 1980. Where Trifunovic got his information, Vukcevic does not know. By our quasi-legal standard here, that puts it into the category of hearsay. While Mr. Vukcevic impressed me as a man of integrity and intelligence, we must have more factual support before accepting his views. Research, Not Speculation: The Heuer Article In terms of factual research, Valter Heuer of Estonia appears at this time to be doing the best work on the Keres-Botvinnik case. Heuer, who knew Keres well, has described in "New In Chess" (#4, 1995) his decades-long search for the facts. He uncovered such important documents as the Molotov letter, and he has conducted many interviews, with sources ranging from Garry Kasparov to Keres' widow, some of which I have already cited. Some highlights from his "NIC" article: 1) Keres appears to corroborate allegations that the 1941 "Absolute" Championship of the USSR was organized for Botvinnik's benefit. In a letter he complained "The tournament conditions are appropriate for Mischenka [i.e. Botvinnik] but not for other contestants." 2) Alekhine repeatedly offered Keres a title match circa 1942-44 but Keres declined, not wanting a match during depressing wartime conditions. Some Russians, notably Kotov, unfairly imputed cowardice to Keres in this. 3) Keres was never imprisoned by the Soviets, contrary to assertions by Koltanowski and others. Furthermore, while Heuer cites GM Yuri Averbakh's claim of a warrant for Keres' arrest in 1944, he describes no formal arrest ever taking taking place, contrary to Evans and Schroeder, who claim Keres was arrested and/or faced with imminent execution. This is not at all to say Keres was treated well during 1944-46. His movements were circumscribed, and he was at least twice lengthily interrogated, once frighteningly at secret police headquarters while suffering from an ear infection. Worse, in October 1944, he also had his home confiscated, though Keres said this was due to authorities confusing him with a wanted criminal, one Robert Keres. Heuer does not say when or if the mistake was ever rectified. 4) Keres' ceding to Botvinnik of the right to challenge Alekhine probably took place on a visit to Moscow in December 1945. Heuer raises the question of a secret match deciding the issue but does not pursue it. 5) As late as 1947 a group of Soviet players "lodged a complaint in which Keres was still stamped as a fascist." In sum, Heuer shows that Keres had a very hard time in the post-war years leading up to Hague-Moscow, hardships which surely could have affected his play. Heuer quotes Boris Spassky, that a world championship aspirant "must forget everything else in this world, throw aside all the superfluous" which a man in Keres' trying position could not possibly do. Heuer's Conclusions However, Heuer does not claim that these hardships constituted a policy aimed at sabotaging Keres' chess. He notes that Keres' widow Maria denies any fix. During the 1948 tournament, Heuer "maintained contacts with the Hague and Moscow, in general I got a certain idea of Keres' ambitions and moods." Finally, Heuer concludes: "I have no proof that those historic competitions were only bad charades. *On the contrary, the facts known to me confirm that Keres went to fight and win.*" (my emphasis). So here is Heuer, a diligent researcher with more firsthand evidence, more opportunity than anyone else to prove conspiracy, and as a Keres admirer and fellow Estonian, more than ample motivation to do so. Yet he can not. Bronstein vs. the Tin God The glaring flaws in Schroeder's arguments, the more subtle flaws in Evans', Botvinnik's denials, the plausibility of alternate explanations, and finally Heuer's reservations, were leading me to conclude that either there was no overt conspiracy in 1948, or that if there were, it was far from being proven. Had I not read David Bronstein's "The Sorcerer's Apprentice," that is probably how this article would have concluded. The Ukrainian GM Bronstein was in 1951 the first challenger for Botvinnik's crown. Bronstein led late in the match, but Botvinnik managed to tie (+5 -5 =14) and by rule kept his title, by the least possible margin. As with Keres, it has been speculated that Bronstein was coerced to lose. "The Sorcerer's Apprentice" (Cadogan, 1995), part games collection, part memoir, never touches directly on the Keres- Botvinnik case, which is somewhat surprising, as they were close friends. However, it offers many relevant insights by a contemporary Soviet chess insider. Here are some of the most important: 1) Bronstein does not unequivocally say whether he was coerced in 1951: "A lot of nonsense has been written about this," he says, but adds "I was subjected to strong psychological pressure from various sources and it was entirely up to me to yield to that pressure or not" (p. 16). This annoyingly vague but ominous statement leads one to wonder what "strong psychological pressure" might have been put to Keres. 2) Botvinnik's first major international notice came in 1933 by drawing a ten game match (+2 -2 =8) with Salo Flohr. Bronstein claims that Flohr, who at one point had a 2-game lead, was bribed to let Botvinnik draw the match (p. 83). 3) When American GM Reuben Fine declined to play at Hague- Moscow 1948, many felt Miguel Najdorf should have taken his place. According to Bronstein's co-author Tom Fuerstenberg, that was vetoed by Botvinnik out of spite, for Najdorf's boasting at Groningen 1946 that he would "pluck Botvinnik like a chicken," and then doing just that at the board (p. 10). This directly contradicts Botvinnik, who says that Najdorf offered a draw beforehand ("Aim," p. 103). 4) Botvinnik in 1948 already realized the threat Bronstein posed, and tried (unsuccessfully) to keep him out of the Interzonal (p. 88). 5) Botvinnik personally dictated the championship qualifying rules adopted by FIDE, setting up a stacked deck to maximize his advantage as incumbent (pp. 17, 108, 120). Even a rule seemingly motivated by fairness, limiting the number of candidates from any one country, was a Botvinnik ploy to lower the number of opponents he had to prepare for (p. 120). Bronstein in sum paints a very unflattering picture of Botvinnik: a petty, pompous egoist who reveled in his role as a tin god of Socialist Culture, and who had few if any scruples about reaching and maintaining himself on that pedestal. What to make of this? It could be dismissed as the catty cheap shots of a disgruntled has-been, and some of Bronstein's book does smack of sour grapes and fogeyism. Yet Bronstein has always been respected for his integrity, and the accuracy of his memory. Clearly on the Najdorf veto, either he or Botvinnik is wrong or lying. And if points #4 or #5 are true, then Botvinnik lied when he claimed "I never intrigued." Ironically, and surprisingly, Bronstein even says string-pulling gave him the title shot in the first place. "Isaac Boleslavsky was leading in the [1950] Candidates Tournament but after a talk with [Soviet Chess Federation head] Boris Vainstein he decided to slow down to allow me to tie for first place with him," (p. 107; my emphasis) resulting in a play-off which Bronstein won. The irony is that this seems contrary to the policy usually ascribed to the Soviets. Bronstein, with a politically tainted father, and a winning record (+1 =1) against Botvinnik at the time, would appear to have been less desirable than the politically clean Boleslavsky, who couldn't beat Botvinnik with a stick (+0 -7 =4 through 1950). If Soviet policy was to make the chess world safe for Communism and Botvinnik, why help Bronstein? Still, this is further testimony that the Soviets sometimes rigged results in FIDE events. And it is clear that Bronstein and Botvinnik cannot both be taken at face value. If "Achieving the Aim's" depiction of a stern but fair Botvinnik is valid, then Bronstein is a character assassin. If Bronstein is right, then Botvinnik's credibility is compromised, and with it some of his defense against charges of complicity. And if he is complicit, he is, arguably, the greatest cheat and hypocrite in chess history. The Testimony of Sztein Some months after writing the above paragraph and, I thought, completing this article, Hanon Russell brought a new source to my attention: Emanuel Sztein, whom I interviewed by telephone in March 1998. Sztein, a Russian emigre, is a chess master, historian and writer with contacts among the older generation of ex-Soviet grandmasters. He has, for example, served as press attache to Viktor Korchnoi, and was friends with the aforementioned Feodor Bohatirchuk in Canada c. 1973-80. Sztein is certain that Keres was coerced, with Botvinnik actively complicit. In support, he first offered two incidents as indirect evidence. One, at the 1935 Moscow tournament, Bohatirchuk defeated Botvinnik in their game. Sztein says that according to Bohatirchuk, immediately after that, Bohatirchuk was told by Krylenko, then supreme administrative head of Soviet chess, in a manner heavy with thinly veiled threats, that he was never to defeat Botvinnik again. Two, at one time Botvinnik desired to obtain a *dacha* (summer house) in an area normally reserved for the highest of the Soviet *nomenklatura*. This request was opposed by Lavrente Beria, politically an extremely powerful man, perhaps second then only to Stalin in the Soviet hierarchy. According to Sztein, Botvinnik went over Beria's head, and got his request granted. These incidents, he says, illustrate the tremendous influence Botvinnik wielded. When I pointed out that this did not necessarily mean that Botvinnik used this influence against Keres, Sztein had an extremely interesting response. Sztein said he is privy to the memoirs of GM Yuri Averbakh, which are to be published (in Russian) in the near future. Averbakh (born 1922), has been not only a strong player, but also editor of the principal Soviet chess magazine "Schachmaty", a member of several important FIDE committees, and president of the Soviet Chess Federation (1972-77). He therefore has been heavily involved in all aspects of Soviet chess. Sztein, tantalizingly, said he was not yet at liberty to divulge excerpts from Averbakh's memoirs until they are published, but he made it clear they included revelations about dirty deals, including the Keres case. He further stated that Botvinnik, while he lived, was extremely concerned about his posthumous image (note: Vukcevic also mentioned this), and that some in Russia who might have spoken against Botvinnik have to date held their tongues due to fear of reprisal from Botvinnik's friends and heirs. The tantalizing ambiguity of the Averbakh implications was frustrating to me, but Sztein refused to elaborate further. So I asked him point blank: did he believe Keres was coerced in 1948? His response: "I know it with certainty." And Botvinnik was actively complicit? "Yes." This Way Lies Madness The reader can now appreciate the maddening complexities of this affair. Mystery, contradictory claims and implications abound. My conclusion? Frankly, few things would give me more pleasure than to say that Keres, by all accounts one of the kindest gentlemen who ever pushed a pawn, had been cheated by the humorless Stalinist Botvinnik. It may yet come to that, but has not quite yet. On the one hand we have the diligent researcher Heuer, who cannot, with his available evidence, conclude that Hague-Moscow 1948, or any other tournaments involving Keres and Botvinnik, were "only bad charades." He clearly shows that Keres suffered under handicaps, some government-imposed, which probably affected his play, but lacks clear proof that Soviet policy was to sabotage Keres or that Botvinnik had the KGB order him to lose. Heuer hardly succeeds in allaying all suspicion, however. Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence, and the testimony of Vukcevic, Sztein and Bronstein at least raises eyebrows, perhaps even stands one's hair on end. However Vukcevic and Sztein are in part corroborative, in part contradictory. Bronstein says nothing directly about the Keres case, and Sztein's testimony would be more forceful if directly corroborated by a primary source such as Averbakh. By the quasi-legal standard I have tried to uphold, their status as evidence is problematic. Heuer has reason to believe that the complete government files on Keres are "in the foreign policy archives of the Russian Federation," but as of 1995 his requests for access had been denied. If those come to light, and the expected memoirs of Averbakh are published, the Keres case, and other unresolved questions of the highly politicized world of Soviet chess, may be definitely settled. Heuer pleads that "the Keres dossiers must be made available. This is the demand made by his honour and dignity as well as Botvinnik's, the honour and dignity of the chess world." I would add to that a plea that the Averbakh memoirs be published in English as well as Russian. I also urge the chess journalism community to heed Heuer's plea. Help him, or send someone to Russia and Estonia to investigate, to dig into archives and to interview people who may know, such as Bronstein, Smyslov, Averbakh or Yefim Geller, and soon, before they are gone. Find out as much as can found, and replace opinion and speculation with fact. The honor and dignity of the chess world, not to mention its sense of justice and its burning curiosity, do indeed demand it. Bibliography Botvinnik, Mikhail "Achieving the Aim," Cadogan Books, London, 1981. Botvinnik, Mikhail "Half a Century of Chess," Simon & Schuster, 1996. Bronstein, David and Tom Fuerstenberg, "The Sorcerer's Apprentice," Cadogan Books, London, 1995. Divinsky, Nathan "The Batsford Chess Encyclopedia," B. T. Batsford Ltd., London, 1990. Divinsky, Nathan "Life Maps of the Great Chess Masters," International Chess Enterprises, Seattle, 1993. "Encyclopedia Brittanica," William Benton, Chicago, 1972, vol. 8, entry on Estonia. Evans, Larry "The Tragedy of Paul Keres", "Chess Life," October 1996, New Windsor, NY, USA; Glenn Petersen, editor. Also "Evans on Chess" from the 4/97, 8/97, and 10/97 issues. Fauber, R.E. "Impact of Genius," International Chess Enterprises, 1992. Heuer, Valter, "The Troubled Years of Paul Keres, the Great Silent One", "New In Chess" #4, 1995, Amsterdam, Holland; Jan Timman, editor. Hooper, David and Kenneth Whyld, "The Oxford Companion to Chess," Oxford University Press, 1996. Keene, Raymond and Nathan Divinsky, "Warriors of the Mind," Harding Simpole Publishing, Brighton, UK, 1989 Keres, Paul "Grandmaster of Chess: the Complete Games of Paul Keres," translated by Harry Golombek, Arco, New York, 1977. Keres, Paul and John Nunn, "Paul Keres: the Quest for Perfection," International Chess Enterprises, 1997. Richards, D.J. "Soviet Chess: Chess and Communism in the U.S.S.R.," Clarendon Press, Oxford, UK, 1965. Schroeder, James "Keres and Botvinnik", "CHESS," April 1996, London, UK; Malcolm Pein, editor. Yanofsy, D., H. Slavekoorde, I. A. Horowitz, and H. Kmoch, "Battle Royal", "Chess Review," April-August 1948, New York , NY, USA; I. A. Horowitz, editor. Copyright 1998 Taylor Kingston. All Rights Reserved.