The Kibitzer
By Tim Harding

Bobby Fischer, 25 Years On

For my generation, who started playing chess in the early 1960s, it
comes as a shock to realise that is now a little over 25 years since
the American genius Bobby Fischer became World Chess
Champion. To my regret, he is the one postwar world champion
(not counting Alekhine) whom I never saw play nor ever spoke to.

Fischer's summer 1972 title match against Boris Spassky in the
Icelandic capital, Reykjavik, brought to an end the Soviet postwar
monopoly on the chess crown and was the culmination of a career
that began in the late 1950s. Already at 15 years of age he was a
grandmaster, a record at that time, and his battle to reach the top
(sometimes, it seemed, a battle with himself) was the background
for all the major chess events of the 1960s; when he didn't play (as
in the two Candidates series won by Spassky) he was like
Banquo's ghost at Macbeth's feast. 

It seemed to many people in the West that the world championship
finals of 1966 and 1969 lacked some meaning because the world's
best player was not competing just as Kasparov's absence from
this year's FIDE "knockout world championship" will detract from
the meaningfulness of whoever emerges as victor. No doubt
Spassky himself felt this during his reign from 1969-72. 

Bobby Fischer's impact on the chess scene may be less obvious to
those who have come to chess during the 1980s (during which
decade Fischer did not compete at all) and the 1990s (when his
sole appearance was his strange "re-match of the century" in 1992,
played contrary to U.N. embargo during the Yugoslav civil war). 

Grandmaster John Nunn, in his recently published new edition of
the book "The Development of Chess Style" (based on an original
work by Euwe), writes that: "While it is a cause for regret that
Fischer did not continue to produce scintillating games, he perhaps
had a greater impact on chess than any other twentieth century
player". This is certainly no exaggeration.

He was born in Chicago on March 9, 1943  so he is still not too
old to make another comeback, especially when you consider that
Smyslov reached the Candidates Final in 1984, 30 years after he
first played a match for the world title and 27 years after becoming
world champion. However, in Fischer's case such a comeback does
appear improbable. After reviewing some of the highlights of
Fischer's career, I have picked out three games to illustrate his
almost faultless and universal style of play. 

His first career landmark was when he became the youngest winner
of the U.S. Junior Championship in 1956. He retained the title in
1957 and went on to win the U.S. Open (on tiebreak from GM
Arthur Bisguier). At the end of the year he took first prize in the
1957-8 U.S. Championship, a point clear of Reshevsky (the first of
eight successive victories in the national championship), and so
qualified for the 1958 Portoroz tournament, the next stepping-stone
towards the world title. He was still not 15 years old, still at school.

The fairytale continued a few months later in Yugoslavia where
Fischer played the interzonal with great maturity, especially in the
second half, and took the sixth qualifying place with its automatic
qualification for the GM title. The next year, the Candidates
tournament (an eight-player event where each competitor played
his rivals four times) was a great learning experience for the now
16-year-old, who now dropped out of school to concentrate on
chess.

In the next few years he played several major events: third with
Keres behind Tal and Gligoric in Zurich 1959, first prize with
Spassky in Mar del Plata 1960 (followed by a poor result in the
Buenos Aires event), second behind Tal in the great Bled 1961
event that had everyone who mattered except Botvinnik, and first
by two and a half points in the 1962 Stockholm interzonal.

Yet the one great prize eluded him. At the 1962 Curacao
Candidates tournament, he came only fourth (well behind
Petrosian, Keres and Geller) and (almost certainly unfairly)
accused the Soviet players of colluding against him. This was
Fischer's first big setback; for all his great talent, he was still a
little young and inexperienced to take on the USSR's best.
However, Fischer continued to play the U.S. Championship,
including his incredible 11/11 clean sweep in the 1963-64 event.

For the 1965 (and all subsequent) Candidates series, the format
was changed to knockout matches but Fischer declined to play in
that cycle, the first of his "retirements". His walkout at Sousse, in a
dispute over playing conditions and the tournament schedule, led
to his second "time-out" which left Petrosian and Spassky to
dispute the world throne a second time, although he did play some
relatively minor events in 1968. Few outside the USSR now
doubted that Fischer really was the world's best player if he could
only get his act together.

Then in March 1970 Fischer was lured back to competition for the
USSR-Rest of the World match in Belgrade where he played board
two (Larsen insisted on top board) and defeated Petrosian 3-1. First
prizes at Rovinj/Zagreb and Buenos Aires followed but in the
Siegen olympiad Fischer lost one game, to Spassky.

Then, in November-December 1970 came the mammoth Palma de
Mallorca interzonal where Fischer completed what he had left
unfinished at Sousse three years earlier. twenty-three games, 18
and a half points. Trailing on 15 points were Larsen (the only one
to beat Fischer), Geller and Huebner. Then came 1971, the
Candidates matches and the two great whitewashes: Taimanov 6-0
in Vancouver (May), Larsen 6-0 in Denver (July). Petrosian was
the final obstacle: Buenos Aires in September/October. Fischer
won, then lost; three draws followed and then four wins for Fischer
put him through to challenge Spassky.

The 1972 world championship match nearly did not happen, until
London financier Jim Slater stepped in to boost the prize fund.
Fischer began tentatively, losing the first game with a blunder in
the ending and defaulting game two in a row over television
cameras. Game 3 (see below) saw the match resume with a win for
Fischer and he steamrollered on from there.

After this match, he did not play in public again for 20 years, and
was stripped of the world title in 1975 following a
well-documented row with FIDE in which he demanded what most
people agreed were unreasonable conditions for the world title
defence match against Karpov. In this case Fischer really trapped
himself because, despite the three-year lay-off, he should have
been able to beat the (then) relatively inexperienced Karpov even
in a traditional best-of-24-games match, but he had never played
Karpov and may have feared the unknown.

However, you don't have to admire Fischer the man to be
impressed and fascinated by his play. As Nunn says in the book
already cited, he turned the methods of the Soviet school of chess
against it: Botvinnik-style scientific study of all areas of the game,
in-depth openings preparation that has probably only been equaled
or bettered by Kasparov, and a passionate will to win that only
Alekhine and Larsen could match. 

Any loss by Fischer was news, especially if it was against a player
not in the very world top (e.g. to Kovacevic at Rovinj/Zagreb). His
openings repertoire was fairly narrow but virtually impeccable. He
did not force play into particular channels but played with great
objectivity into whatever offered the best winning chances, be it a
tactical or positional middlegame or an ending. He rarely lost the
initiative, but could defend well when it was necessary. He could
be brilliant but did not seek brilliancy for its own sake; he
preferred the point on the crosstable. Psychologically he was
strong, usually coming back with powerful wins to avenge past
defeats, e.g. against Larsen and Spassky.

In such a column as this there is no room for in-depth notes but I
have selected three games and would recommend you to play them
through offline, taking your time and trying to guess Fischer's next
move. 

I did not want to select any of those games which are well known
from his classic book "My Sixty Memorable Games", but that ends
with Sousse 1967. Much of the best was yet to come.

The first game comes from a late round in the 1970 interzonal
when Fischer could relax a bit as he was home and dry; he used the
occasion to vary from his once habitual "best by test" 1 e4. His
opponent was the Brazilian prodigy Henrique Mecking:

Fischer - Mecking, Palma Mallorca izt (21), 1970 Larsen's
Opening (A06)

1 b3 d5 2 Bb2 c5 3 Nf3 Nc6 4 e3 Nf6 5 Bb5 Bd7 6 0-0 e6 Mecking
has defended passively, in effect allowing Fischer to play a
Nimzoindian with reversed colours His 5th move prevents the
doubling of his c-pawn but it is well known that an early Bd2 is a
weak move against the "Nimzo".

7 d3 Be7 8 Bxc6 Bxc6 9 Ne5 Rc8 10 Nd2 0-0 11 f4 

Now White has a good Bird's opening formation Mecking seeks
relief by exchanges but Fischer moves his pieces smoothly into
good squares 

11 Nd7 12 Qg4 Nxe5 13 Bxe5 Bf6 14 Rf3 Qe7 15
Raf1 a5 16 Rg3 Bxe5 17 fxe5 f5 

Mecking probably realised 17 g6
would leave his king position fatally compromised Fischer now
switches plans. Rather than continue with an unclear attack, he
takes the extra pawn on offer (though it will be doubled and
isolated) because both of his pieces will be superior to their
opposite numbers. 

18 exf6 Rxf6

DIAGRAM

19 Qxg7+! Qxg7 20 Rxf6 Qxg3 21 hxg3 Re8 22 g4!

The pawn will support the pieces and can later be exchanged for
the h-pawn to give Fischer a passed pawn.

22...a4 23 Nf3 axb3 24 axb3 Kg7 25 g5 e5 26 Nh4 Bd7 

This is necessary to stop the knight reaching d6 via f5.

27 Rd6 Be6 28 Kf2 Kf7 29 Rb6 Re7 30 e4 

With the black rook tied to defending b7, Fischer fixes e5: also
weak because the bishop cannot defend it.

30...dxe4 31 dxe4 c4 32 b4 Bg4 33 Ke3 

Typical Fischer pragmatism, centralising the king and getting it off
the open file before making his pawn break. Here a computer
program like Fritz5 would claim that 33 Nf5+ is the winning move
but why exchange pieces when the knight (although temporarily
"on the rim") is the superior piece?

33 Rd7 34 g6+ Kf8 35 gxh7 Rxh7 36 Ng6+ Ke8 37 Nxe5 Bc8 38
Nxc4 Kd8 39 Nd6 Rg7 40 Kf2 Kc7 41 Nxc8 Kxc8 42 Rd6 1-0.

Here is the crucial game from the 1972 match where Fischer
opened his account:

Spassky - Fischer Reykjavik Wch (3), 1972 Modern Benoni (A77)

1 d4 Nf6 2 c4 e6 3 Nf3 c5 

In the days when world title matches were contested by the likes of
Botvinnik, Smyslov and Petrosian, only "politically correct" moves
like 3 d5, 3 b6 or 3 Bb4+ would have been countenanced here.
Fischer, however, was never afraid to play the sharpest opening
lines like the Najdorf Sicilian or Modern Benoni because he had
studied them in greater depth, probably, than anybody else in the
world. His move-order route to the Benoni should be noted.

4 d5 exd5 5 cxd5 d6 6 Nc3 g6 7 Nd2 Nbd7 8 e4 Bg7 9 Be2 0-0 10
0-0 Re8 11 Qc2 Nh5!?

DIAGRAM

The move of the match, perhaps: yet again Fischer, unaffected by
dogma, plays his knight to the h-file. In the Palma interzonal he
had selected 11 Ne5 against Gligoric but an antidote had since
been discovered. The dilemma for Spassky is (since it is
undesirable to allow the knight into f4) that he can damage
Fischer's pawn but only at the cost of giving up the bishop pair.

12 Bxh5 gxh5 13 Nc4 

13 b3 has also been seen but is not clearly better.

13...Ne5 14 Ne3 Qh4 

This is Fischer's active idea but Psakhis suggested 14 Ng4!? in
his book "The Complete Benoni".

15 Bd2 

Spassky drifts into trouble. Psakhis says White should play 15 Ne2
Ng4 16 Nxg4 hxg4 17 Ng3 Be5 18 Bd2 with some advantage.

15...Ng4 16 Nxg4 hxg4 17 Bf4 

Here 17 Ne2 was definitely superior.

17...Qf6 18 g3?

As 18 Qd2 could be answered by 18 b5 the right move is probably
18 Bg3 with ideas of opening the f-file. Now Spassky's king
position becomes a serious weakness which Fischer methodically
sets out to exploit. 

18  Bd7 19 a4 b6 20 Rfe1 a6 21 Re2 b5! 

DIAGRAM

22 Rae1 

After 22 axb5 axb5 23 Rxa8 Rxa8 the typical anti-Benoni
breakthrough 24 e5 fails to 24 Ra1+ 25 Kg2 dxe5 26 Rxe5 b4 27
Ne4 Qa6 with the winning threat of  Qf1.

22...Qg6 23 b3 Re7 24 Qd3 Rb8 25 axb5 axb5 

Black now threatens to win the exchange by 26 b4 and 27 Bb5.
26 b4 c4 27 Qd2 Rbe8 28 Re3 h5 As White is now completely
under restraint, Fischer can seek a winning plan at leisure. He
probes the kingside.

29 R3e2 Kh7 30 Re3 Kg8 31 R3e2 Bxc3 

More pragmatism: Black gives up the apparently strong
fianchettoed bishop for the knight to win a pawn although this
leaves opposite colored bishops and gives White a couple of
temporary threats.

32 Qxc3 Rxe4 33 Rxe4 Rxe4 34 Rxe4 Qxe4 35 Bh6 Qg6 36 Bc1
Qb1 37 Kf1 Bf5 38 Ke2 Qe4+ 39 Qe3 Qc2+ 40 Qd2 Qb3 41 Qd4
Bd3+ 0-1.

Black sealed the bishop check and on resumption after overnight
analysis, Spassky resigned when he saw the move. If 42 Ke3 (to
avoid losing the b-pawn with check) 42 Qd1 43 Bb2 Qe1+ 44 Kf4
Qd2+ wins the bishop.

The 1992 Spassky-Fischer match was not on the same level, with
Spassky well below his 1972 standard in most games (although he
led at one stage). The match was 90 percent media hype but it still
saw some good play, particularly from Fischer who produced a few
opening novelties. Game 11 was good fun:

Fischer,R - Spassky Sveti Stefan m (11), 1992 Sicilian Defence
(B31)

1 e4 c5 2 Nf3 Nc6 3 Bb5 g6 4 Bxc6

This used to be postponed but by 1992 the immediate exchange
was becoming the trend. The main point is that if Black recaptures
with the d-pawn White can delay castling and adopt a plan based
on 5 h3 (to avoid  Bg4).

4 bxc6 5 0-0 Bg7 6 Re1 e5 7 b4!?

A new Wing Gambit-style move that succeeded dramatically. The
normal plan was 7 c3 Ne7 8 d4. In Game 13 Spassky played
6 f6!? the ingenious to avoid a repetition of this line.

7 cxb4 8 a3 c5

If 8 ..bxa3 White could try 9 Bxa3 or 9 Nxa3!?) 9 ..d6 10 d4 exd4
11 e5 to open the centre.

9 axb4 cxb4 10 d4 exd4 

If 10 d6 White gets strong play for his sacrificed material by 11
c3! bxc3 12 dxe5 dxe5 13 Qc2 with follow-ups like Ba3, Red1 and
Nxc3-d5.

11 Bb2 d6 12 Nxd4 Qd7 13 Nd2 Bb7?

The losing move; chances are about equal with 13 Ne7 whereas
now the black king is caught in the centre.

14 Nc4 Nh6 15 Nf5! Bxb2

Not 15 ..Nxf5? as 16 exf5 is check.

16 Ncxd6+ Kf8 17 Nxh6 

DIAGRAM

17...f6? 

Here 17..Bxa1 18 Qxa1 obviously looks horrible but Black could
fight on by 18 Qxd6 19 Qxh8+ Ke7 20 Qxh7 Qe6. 

Now White has a dream attack:

18 Ndf7! Qxd1 19 Raxd1 Ke7 20 Nxh8 Rxh8 21 Nf5+ gxf5 22
exf5+ Be5 

If 22 ..Kf8 23 Rd8+ Kg7 24 Re7+.

23 f4 Rc8 24 fxe5 Rxc2 25 e6! Bc6 26 Rc1 Rxc1 27 Rxc1 Kd6 28
Rd1+ Ke5

If 28...Ke7 29 Ra1 b3 30 Rxa7+ and the rook easily copes with the
b-pawn.

29 e7 a5 30 Rc1 Bd7 31 Rc5+ Kd4 32 Rxa5 b3 33 Ra7 Be8 34
Rb7 Kc3 35 Kf2 b2 36 Ke3 Bf7 37 g4 Kc2 38 Kd4 b1Q 39 Rxb1
Kxb1 40 Kc5 Kc2 41 Kd6 1-0.

Black resigned in view of 41 Be8 42 Ke6 and Kxf6 etc.

The 1992 match was played to the rules he had wanted for the
1975 Karpov contest that never was. Fischer won by the margin of
10 wins to 5, with 15 draws, to earn a $3.35 million purse. He
moved to Hungary and has not played another competitive game in
the five years since.